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Abstract 
The question of whether more competition among banks increases relationship banking, 
which is predicted to improve credit availability for informationally opaque firms in 
theory, is a controversial issue in the banking literature.  By using firm-level survey 
data in Japan, this paper provides evidence for the negative correlation between lending 
competition and the provision of relationship banking.  This paper raises the question 
whether fierce interbank competition is always beneficial for small firms. 
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1 Introduction 
The existing theories provide us with mixed conclusions about the impact of 
lending competition to relationship banking.  In a number of theoretical studies that 
model relationship banking as the acquisition of borrower-specific information by banks, 
it is shown that the increase in the number of competing banks in a local lending market 
leads to a reduction in information acquisition by these banks. This is because the 
additional market share that can be captured by the information advantage over rival 
banks decreases, and, therefore, it is more difficult to recoup the investment cost for 
information acquisition when the number of rivals increases (Petersen and Rajan 1995; 
Hauswald and Marquez 2006).  On the other hand, several studies that model 
relationship banking as a provision of borrower-specific consulting or monitoring 
services to improve the probability of success of their borrowers’ projects show the 
possibility that a bank is more likely to provide such consulting or monitoring services 
as the number of competing banks increases in order to fend off the competitive 
pressure from outside banks (Boot and Thakor 2000; Dinç 2000; Yafeh and Yosha 2001; 
Marquez and Dell’Ariccia 2004). 
Some researchers resort to empirical studies in order to answer the question of 
whether or not lending competition promotes relationship banking.  For example, Elsas 
(2005) and Degryse and Ongena (2007) find that the probability for a firm to maintain a 
long-term and broad-based relationship with a bank is U-shaped against the 
concentration measure in local lending markets in Germany and in Belgium, 
respectively.  However, Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Montreal-Garriga (2005) find 
evidence for the negative correlation between lending competition and relationship 
banking in the U.S.  
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Most of the empirical studies focus on the informational aspect of relationship 
banking by measuring its existence by the length of the relationship or by the breadth of 
the relationship including whether a firm purchases a particular type of bank product 
that generates an information advantage for the providing banks, such as checking 
account services.  Although these measures of relationship banking are reasonable 
under the limited feasibility of data, we have to admit that these measures are indirect 
for measuring the information advantage over rival banks.  The present empirical study 
uses a more direct measure constructed from the firm-level information about whether a 
firm receives firm-specific consulting services from its main bank.  By using this 
measure, we find that such consulting services are more likely to be provided in less 
competitive lending markets.   
 
2 Data 
Our unique dataset is constructed from the firm-level microdata collected from the 
Survey of the Financial Environment of Enterprises in October 2002 by the Japanese 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency.  The survey targeted 15,000 non-agricultural 
private companies in Japan.  The targets were randomly sampled by industry, size class 
of capital, and number of employees from those registered with Tokyo Shoko Research, 
Ltd., one of the largest private credit reporting companies in Japan.  The response rate 
of the question that we used for our relationship measure was 59.4% (8,229 companies).  
Most of the sample companies were small or medium-sized enterprises that are not 
publicly traded.  The survey sought information from firms concerning the details of 
financing activities and financial environments, including the duration and scope of the 
relationship with a main bank.  The response from each firm was matched with its 
3 
 
financial statement when available.  It is also possible to match each observation with 
the economic conditions in the prefecture where the responding firm was located.  In 
our study, each of 47 prefectures is assumed to comprise a unit of a local lending market, 
according to the finding that the Japanese lending market is geographically segmented 
by prefecture (Ishikawa and Tsutsui 2006).   
The survey contained a multiple-choice question about what services other than 
commercial loans firms received from their main banks.  Such additional services 
included advice about financial and management matters.  We interpret this advising 
service as a proxy for the customer-specific consulting service that is modeled in Boot 
et al. (2000) and others.  After sorting observations by prefecture, we calculate the 
ratio of firms that receive such consulting services from their main banks in each 
prefecture.  This serves as a measure of the likelihood of the existence of relationship 
banking in each local lending market.  We call this variable the Ratio of Advised Firms.  
We used two measures of the intensity of lending competition in each prefecture: 
(1) The number of lending institutions that have at least one regular branch in each 
prefecture, Number of Banks; and (2) the Herfindahl index of the number of regular 
branches in each prefecture, Herfindahl Index of Branches.  We collect the number of 
branches of each financial institution in each prefecture as of March 20021 from the 
Nihon Kin'yu Meikan (the directory of Japanese financial institutions), published by 
Nihon Kin’yu Tsushin Sha.  
To control for average firm characteristics in each prefecture that are predicted to 
have some impact on relationship banking in the literature, we included Average 
Number of Employees, the Average Years of a Relationship with a Main Bank, and the 
                                                  
1 We used the number as of April 2002 for Mizuho Financial Group, which merged in April 2002. 
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Average Age of a Firm in each prefecture into the explanatory variables in our 
regression analysis.  
The descriptive statistics of these variables are listed in Table 1.  Table 2 shows 
the correlation matrix among these variables.  The correlation between the Ratio of 
Advised Firms and the concentration measures suggests that lending competition has a 
negative impact on relationship banking.  The negative correlation between the 
lending-market concentration and the average firm size appears to reflect the fact that 
both firm size and the number of competing banks are larger in a metropolitan area.  
This point prompts suspicion that lending competition measures could work as proxies 
for firm size.  However, the correlation between the average size of firms and the Ratio 
of Advised Firms is much smaller than that between the concentration measures and the 
Ratio of Advised Firms.  Although this result suggests that the degree of lending 
competition is a more significant determinant of the likelihood of relationship banking, 
we provide formal regression analyses in the next section.  
 
3 Regression Analysis 
3.1 Baseline regression 
Table 3 is the list of estimated coefficients when the Ratio of Advised Firms in each 
prefecture is regressed on various sets of explanatory variables.  Since the dependent 
variable is a probability, we applied weighted least squares estimation with the weight  
equal to ( ) 21/)ˆ1(ˆ iii npp −  ( is the estimated dependent variable in prefecture i, ni is 
the number of observations in prefecture i), so as to adjust the heteroskedasticity 
inherent in a linear probability model.  The coefficients of the Herfindahl Index of 
Branches are positive in all specifications and statistically significant in many of the 
ipˆ
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specifications even after controlling for average firm characteristics.  The coefficients 
of the Number of Banks are negative in all specifications but statistically significant 
only in Specification (2), in which the average number of employees in each prefecture 
is controlled.  The squared measures of these concentration measures do not have any 
significant coefficient (Specification (6)).  
3.2  Differences between large and small firms 
In constructing the variable, Ratio of Advised Firms, we used all observations, 
including larger firms with even over 10,000 employees.  These larger firms are more 
likely to be listed on a stock market and comply with the strict information disclosure 
requirement and the internal governance requirement imposed by the regulator.  
Furthermore, many of these firms operate nationwide rather than locally.  Therefore, 
these firms are not expected to receive advice from their main banks, and, if any, the 
probability for these firms to receive advice from banks is expected to be independent of 
local lending competition.  Thus, the negative correlation between local lending 
competition and the likelihood of relationship banking is expected to be observed more 
clearly among smaller firms, such as those with fewer than 300 employees.2  
To address this point, we split the data set into two groups by firm size, (1) fewer 
than 300 employees (7,521 firms) and (2) 300 or more employees (708 firms), and then 
recalculated the Ratio of Advised Firms in each prefecture.  The estimated coefficients 
with each of these split dataset are listed in Table 4 for small firms and Table 5 for large 
firms.  As expected, the regressions with the dataset constructed only from small firms 
show a negative correlation between local lending competition and relationship banking 
(Table 4), while the regressions with the dataset constructed only from larger firms do 
                                                  
2 The Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Act in Japan defines small and medium-sized 
manufacturers as those with fewer than 300 employees or with capital of less than 300 million JPY.  
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not show such a tendency (Table 5).  
 
4 Conclusion 
Thus, we found that local lending competition has a negative impact on banks’ 
incentive to provide relationship banking, which entails customer-specific consulting 
services.  This result is robust even after controlling for firm characteristics, and the 
negative impacts are more clearly observed in the sample that consists only of small 
firms that are dependent on a local lending market.  This result raises the question 
whether fierce lending competition is always beneficial for borrowing firms and the 
social welfare.  
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Table 1.     Data Description
(1) Definition
Variables
Ratio of advised firms
Herfindahl index of branches
Number of banks
Average number of employees
Average years of a relationship
                       with a main bank
Average age of a firm
(2) Descriptive Statistics
Variables # of obs. Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Ratio of advised firms 47 0.144 0.066 0.000 0.133 0.370
Herfindahl index of branches 47 0.169 0.069 0.040 0.167 0.297
Number of banks 47 29.1 23.6 5 23 146
Average number of employees 47 101.28 72.716 39.108 83.157 452.82
Average years of a relationship
                       with a main bank 47 27.4 3.2 19.4 27.3 33.2
Average age of a firm 47 30.4 2.8 20.7 30.6 36.0
Average firm age in each prefecture calculated from the
observations
Definition
Ratio of firms receiving consulting service from a main bank
 in each prefecture.
Herfindahl index of each prefecture calculated from the number
of branches.
Number of banks that has at least a regular branch in each prefecture. 
Average number of employees of firms in each prefecture calculated
from the obervations in the survey.
Average years of lending relationship with a main bank in each
prefecture calculated from the observations in the survey.
Table 2.     Correlation Coefficients among Variables
Variables 1 2 3 5 6
1 Ratio of advised firms 1
2 Herfindahl index of branches 0.281 1
3 Number of banks (log) -0.234 -0.870 1
5 Average number of employees -0.050 -0.614 0.732 1
6 Average years of a relationship with a main bank 0.095 0.254 -0.233 -0.185 1
7 Average age of a firm -0.088 -0.345 0.414 0.430 0.610
Table 3. Baseline Regression
(1) Herfindahl Index of Branches
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Herfindahl index of branches 0.1275 0.2667 ** 0.1003 0.2215 ** 0.2616 0.2566
(0.0815) (0.1161) (0.0887) (0.1019) (0.1569) (0.1649)
(Herfindahl index of branches)2 -0.4437
(1.7616)
Average number of employees 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0019 0.0009 0.0006
(0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0042)
Average age of a firm 0.0034 0.0014 0.0021
(0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0047)
Constant 0.1234 *** 0.0929 0.0773 0.0055 0.0301 0.0612
(0.0102) (0.0210) (0.0604) (0.0791) (0.0835) (0.0792)
Adjusted R2 0.0305 0.0666 0.0212 0.0568 0.0378 0.0117
Number of observations 47 47 47 47 47 47
(2) Number of Banks
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of banks (log) -0.0070 -0.0365 ** -0.0043 -0.0157 -0.0365 * -0.0391 **
(0.0068) (0.0142) (0.0074) (0.0094) (0.0184) (0.0186)
(Number of banks (log))2 0.0129
(0.0134)
Average number of employees 0.0002 ** 0.0001 * 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0024 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Average age of a firm 0.0034 0.0015 0.0013
(0.0025) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Constant 0.1643 0.2452 *** 0.0907 0.0908 0.1857 ** 0.0780
(0.0269) (0.0431) (0.0798) (0.0611) (0.0909) (0.0764)
Adjusted R2 0.0013 0.1324 -0.0002 0.0319 0.0646 0.0634
Number of observations 47 47 47 47 47 47
Average years of a relationship
                        with a main bank
Average years of a relationship
                        with a main bank
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Advised Firms. Weighted least square estimation.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively (two tailed test).  The content of each parenthesis is the standard error of each estimated coefficient. The Herfindahl index and the
number of banks are the difference from sample mean in the specification (6).
Table 4.  Regression with Small Firms (with fewer than 300 employees)
(1) Herfindahl Index of Branches
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Herfindahl index of branches 0.1827 ** 0.3056 *** 0.1582 0.2084 ** 0.2704 * 0.2552
(0.0822) (0.1023) (0.0944) (0.0884) (0.1477) (0.1570)
(Herfindahl index of branches)2 -0.6917
(1.5590)
Average number of employees 0.0011 * 0.0011 * 0.0013 *
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
0.0012 0.0015 0.0010
(0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0042)
Average age of a firm 0.0021 -0.0003 0.0007
(0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0049)
Constant 0.1116 *** 0.0419 0.0823 0.0451 0.0173 0.0447
(0.0105) (0.0368) (0.0558) (0.0816) (0.0832) (0.0785)
Adjusted R2 0.0789 0.1313 0.0638 0.0719 0.0973 0.0756
Number of observations 47 47 47 47 47 47
(2) Number of Banks
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of banks (log) -0.0123 * -0.0306 *** -0.0095 -0.0142 * -0.0266 * -0.0390 **
(0.0070) (0.0102) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0147) (0.0172)
(Number of banks (log))2 0.0129
(0.0098)
Average number of employees 0.0016 ** 0.0015 ** 0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
0.0017 0.0017 0.0012
(0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Average age of a firm 0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0002
(0.0027) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Constant 0.1788 *** 0.1701 *** 0.1250 0.1316 * 0.1397 * 0.0671
(0.0273) (0.0268) (0.0824) (0.0743) (0.0812) (0.0767)
Adjusted R2 0.0441 0.1324 0.0323 0.0319 0.0971 0.1133
Number of observations 47 47 47 47 47 47
Average years of a relationship
                        with a main bank
Average years of a relationship
                        with a main bank
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Advised Firms. Weighted least square estimation.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively (two tailed test).  The content of each parenthesis is the standard error of each estimated coefficient. The Herfindahl index and the number of
banks are the difference from sample mean in the specification (6).
Table 5.  Regression with Large Firms (with more than 300 employees)
(1) Herfindahl Index of Branches
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Herfindahl index of branches 0.0485 -0.0234 -0.0403 -0.0716 -0.2499 -0.3997
(0.2577) (0.4180) (0.2584) (0.2508) (0.4474) (0.6632)
(Herfindahl index of branches)2 -1.4728
(7.1713)
Average number of employees -3.3E-06 -2.8E-05 -2.8E-05
(4.3E-05) (4.9E-05) (5.8E-05)
-0.0018 -0.0028 -0.0031
(0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027)
Average age of a firm -0.0021 0.0012 0.0027
(0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0051)
Constant 0.1856 0.1953 0.2576 ** 0.2973 * 0.2926 0.1931
(0.0225) (0.0843) (0.0993) (0.1527) (0.2637) (0.2421)
Adjusted R2 -0.0247 -0.0525 -0.0405 -0.0376 -0.0654 -0.0863
Number of observations 41 41 39 41 39 38
(2) Number of Banks
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Number of banks (log) -0.0037 -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0096 0.0046 0.0302
(0.0178) (0.0402) (0.0188) (0.0202) (0.0409) (0.0674)
(Number of banks (log))2 -0.0187
(0.0301)
Average number of employees -6.9E-07 -1.3E-05 -7.8E-06
(6.0E-05) (5.9E-05) (6.2E-05)
-0.0019 -0.0027 -0.0028
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Average age of a firm 0.0029 0.0021 0.0028
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Constant 0.2051 0.1949 * 0.2576 0.0940 0.1852 0.1697
(0.0785) (0.1082) (0.1404) (0.2173) (0.2417) (0.2490)
Adjusted R2 -0.0245 -0.0524 -0.0408 -0.0427 -0.0778 -0.1032
Number of observations 41 41 39 40 39 38
Average years of a relationship
                        with a main bank
Average years of a relationship
                        with a main bank
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Advised Firms. Weighted least square estimation.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively (two tailed test).  The content of each parenthesis is the standard error of each estimated coefficient. The Herfindahl index and the
number of banks are the difference from sample mean in the specification (6).
